A talk by Northwestern’s Dr. John E. Rielly, assessing Obama’s first year in foreign policy as he returns from his debut trip to Asia.

Dr. Rielly, the author of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy and an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Northwestern, has served for three decades as Executive Director and President of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Photo by Sean Emerson Gordon-Marvin

Photo by True Russian Vodka on Flickr, licensed under the Creative Commons

Chenault Taylor

Turns out a hard night’s drinking can be as detrimental for a nation as it is for the health of its individuals. And Russia’s dealing with more than just a headache—its entire body is deteriorating.

The nation’s reputation as one big drinking hole is well-deserved; Russians annually drink double what the World Health Organization considers a ‘health threat’ (whereas Americans are just under the benchmark.) By 2007, Russians were drinking three times as much as they had in 1991, when the Soviet Union fell.

This isn’t a new problem, but it’s now causing even more damage. Male life expectancy is just 60 years, thanks in large part to outrageous rates of alcoholism. While many Asian countries have to implement controls against overpopulation, Russia faces a projected 20 percent population drop by 2050. Alcohol is cited as a perpetuating factor in high unemployment and crime rates. Maybe more importantly, the country is in dire fiscal straits, and Russia’s nasty habit isn’t helping.

President Medvedev is now faced with every parent’s nightmare—confronting their child’s alcoholism. When Gorbachev instituted a near prohibition on alcohol in the 1980s, he got impressive results, but Russians reacted so strongly that most of his measures had to be overturned. Medvedev wants to decrease alcohol consumption by 25 percent by 2012. Pretty ambitious, considering his plan focuses on everything but Russia’s biggest vice: vodka.

While Vodka has long been the country’s favorite, beer is also rising in popularity, especially among young people. This new campaign, kicked off in September, reportedly aims to delay young people from drinking until the legal age of 18 (most start at around 13 now). Medvedev’s proposed plan enforces stricter penalties for selling to minors, and employs an intensive media blitz.

The government strategy’s third prong is a quadrupled tax increase on beer by 2012. Many question the decision to focus on beer, citing the state’s self-interest as the true explanation. Given the failed history of anti-alcohol measures targeting vodka, it makes sense that the Kremlin is scared to reprise that effort, fearing repercussions from the public. But as one Russian reader wrote to the New York Times, “The main harm comes from vodka, especially fake vodka and other surrogates. If beer becomes less accessible, people will drink more low-quality alcohol and death rates will increase.”

Since Medvedev & Co. are hesitant to take away anyone’s precious clear liquid, it follows they would target the next-worse thing. And bottom line, they need the money—Russia’s economy shrank by seven percent in the first quarter of 2009. The measure is expected to raise over 2 billion dollars, and ‘sin taxes’ are some of the least controversial ways to garner funds. Most of the brewers serving Russia are at least partially foreign-owned, whereas the vodka industry is completely domestic. This tax wouldn’t hurt local industry, but could be advocated for as a real push to clean up Russia’s act.

No one thinks it will be easy to change Russians habits, and many believe the government doesn’t really want to. As one citizen explained, “Every 10 to 15 years another ‘struggle’ that never gives any results, and sometimes worsens the situation, has to be announced. The authorities have to shrug their shoulders, with routine phrases like ‘such are the people.’ The reasons are obvious: it is easier to take wealth from a drunken people and sell it to the Chinese and to Europe.”

To many, this seemingly concerted effort seems more like a ploy to garner revenue. Until there are results, it’s hard to trust the Kremlin is “doing the right thing.”

So how does the United States measure up? Although alcoholism is a serious problem at home, we are leaps and bounds from Russia’s consumption catastrophe. The U.S. population is holding steady, even increasing slightly. And as panicked as our nation is regarding the economy, things seem to be on the upswing.

Yes, there is a recession, and yes, college seniors are struggling in the job market. But most realize it’s probably not wise to drink your sorrows away. Not only could you wake up with little recollection of last night’s antics, you could force the government to create a higher excise tax on beer—we wouldn’t want that now, would we?

Maryam Jameel

An Iranian-American scholar spoke at Northwestern about her experiences and arrest in Iran’s Evin Prison.

Driving to the airport in Tehran, Iran, Haleh Esfandiari noticed a car following her.  It suddenly turned in front of her and slammed its breaks.  Esfandiari found herself surrounded by three knife-wielding men who searched her purse and took her passport.

Esfandiari, author of My Prison, My Home, is Director of the Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C.  She is an Iranian-American who was detained in Iran’s Evin Prison for more than 110 days in solitary confinement in 2007.

Speaking at Northwestern University’s Rebecca Crown Center on Thursday evening, Esfandiari told the tale of her unexpected incarceration. Upon losing her passport, she visited a government office to obtain a new one to return home to the U.S. as planned. This was the beginning of a four-month series of daily interrogations, during which she concluded that the theft of her passport had actually been a setup by the Iranian Intelligence Ministry.

After continuous eight-hour days of interrogation, mainly concerning her work for the Woodrow Wilson Center, Esfandiari was presented with a warrant for her arrest.  She was accused of “endangering national security,” an accusation she found comical as a 67-year-old, under five foot woman. She was to be sent to Evin, a prison notorious for its disappearances, torture, and killings. “I think the roof came just tumbling down on my head [at that point], because I was familiar with Evin Prison,” Esfandiari said.

Upon hearing the news, Esfandiari called her mother to inform her of her fate, and to have her arrange for a lawyer. Soon Shirin Ebadi, Iranian lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize winner, was representing her, though Ebadi could have little power over Esfandiari’s case in Iran. Ebadi worked to publicize her client’s incarceration, hoping that with enough pressure placed on Iran, Esfandiari could be freed.

During her time at Evin, Esfandiari kept a strict routine in order to maintain her mental and physical health. “I had to prove to myself that they did not break me, they did not break my spirit,” said Esfandiari. “I learned to appreciate the rule of law and my freedom.”

Through her story, Esfandiari explains the mindset of Iran under its past regime. It was overcome by paranoia of the U.S. trying to undermine it; the regime was fearful of American universities, think tanks, and research centers being used to infiltrate the government, fearful that a person like Esfandiari could be used against Iran.  Esfandiari said she feels she was the victim of the animosity and lack of understanding between the U.S. and Iran.

While in prison, Esfandiari had no access to the outside world, and knew nothing of the uproar that had been caused by her arrest. Former presidential candidates Barack Obama and Hilary Clinton, among other public figures, made pleas for her freedom, and eventually the mounting international pressure led to her release.

Esfandiari managed to leave Evin Prison, though she reminded the Northwestern audience that there are still many unjustly accused inmates who remain at the prison, and expressed her hopes of international pressure being employed successfully in the future.

MATTHEW JACOBS

[Fall 2009, Volume X, Issue I]

INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 2007 the United States intelligence community made public certain key judgments of a classified national intelligence estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. The estimate’s surprising conclusion—that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003—clashed with the prevailing consensus that Iran was determined to develop nuclear weapons. This paper seeks to shed light on the flaws in the NIE that led to its erroneous conclusion.
The NIE’s most significant flaw is its failure to characterize Iran’s ongoing “declared civil” uranium enrichment activities as proliferation-sensitive.1 All enrichment activities—whether declared or undeclared—present a proliferation threat because the processes and technology used to enrich uranium for civilian purposes are nearly identical to those used to enrich uranium for weapons purposes. In other words, by mastering the enrichment process at a “declared civil” facility, Iran will be capable of producing weapons-grade fissile material at that facility or at a similar facility elsewhere.

A second major defect in the NIE is its deceptive style of presentation. By opening with the bold proclamation that “in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program,” the NIE drafters ensured that the estimate’s subsequent conclusions would be largely ignored.2 Although the factual findings contained within the 2007 NIE do not differ significantly from those in prior assessments, the 2007 estimate’s sensational headline led to the widespread belief that Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities had changed dramatically.

A third failing of the NIE is its refusal to assess whether or not Iran ultimately intends to develop nuclear weapons. Iran’s long history of secret nuclear activity, its refusal to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its ongoing enrichment activities strongly suggest that Iran is determined to develop a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Iran stands to benefit greatly from nuclear weapons. Nuclear status would make Iran the predominant state in its region, strengthen its national security and foreign policy interests, provide an optimal (if imperfect) deterrent, and validate Iran’s self-perception as a sophisticated global power.

The impact of the NIE within the United States was immediate and profound. As the New York Times noted, “Rarely if ever has a single intelligence estimate so completely, so suddenly and so surprisingly altered a foreign policy debate.”3 Publication of the NIE effectively precluded the Bush administration from using military force against Iran and reduced U.S. diplomatic leverage, making it more difficult to marshal international support for economic sanctions.
The NIE’s impact was felt equally in Tehran. Although Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hailed the report as a “victory against the great powers,” the subsequent reduction in tensions severely weakened his internal standing.4 The nuclear issue and the specter of war with the United States were popular rallying cries for the Iranian leader. When the saber-rattling quieted, Iranians began to focus more of their attention on Ahmadinejad’s domestic failings. More importantly, the cooling of tensions exposed a rift between the president and his former backer, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.

The United States, in cooperation with the international community, must present Tehran a package of incentives and sanctions that convinces it to forego nuclear weapons development. Although the likelihood of diplomatic success at this point in time is small, failure is certain if the Obama administration does not adopt the following simple, but essential, policy recommendations.  First, the Obama administration must work behind the scenes to convince the international community that the putative conclusion of the 2007 NIE is wrong and that Iran is continuing its drive to develop nuclear weapons. Second, the administration must persuade important world leaders that a nuclear Iran is not in their best interests. Finally, the Obama administration must refrain from using unnecessarily aggressive rhetoric toward Iran. The use of such language has only served to entrench the domestically unpopular arch-conservative regime in Tehran. If tensions between the United States and Iran—along with oil prices—remain at current low levels, it is likely that Ahmadinejad and his fellow hardliners will be replaced in the June 2009 national elections by reformists or pragmatic conservatives more willing to engage diplomatically on the nuclear issue.

THE 2007 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE DECONSTRUCTED

The Redefinition of “Nuclear Weapons Program”
The opening sentence of the NIE proclaims “with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.”5 That judgment, however, is qualified by a complex footnote which restricts the definition of “nuclear weapons program” to include only “nuclear weapons design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion- related and uranium enrichment-related work.”6 The footnote explicitly excludes from the definition all “declared civil” enrichment activity—that is, all non-secret enrichment activity that Iran claims to be for non-weapons purposes. The NIE drafters were able to proclaim that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons production in 2003 not because Tehran actually suspended its drive for nuclear weapons, but because the NIE drafters fundamentally changed the definition of “nuclear weapons program.”

This artificially narrow definition of “nuclear weapons program” belies the fact that enriching uranium—whether declared or undeclared—is the most difficult step in the production of nuclear weapons. Weaponization—the actual construction of warheads and delivery systems—is a far simpler process. There is near unanimous agreement in the policy and scientific communities that uranium enrichment is the hardest part of building a nuclear weapon: for example, nuclear experts at the Council of Foreign Relations assert that “uranium enrichment capability…is the vital technology needed for the production of nuclear weapons”;7 Barry Posen, director of the Security Studies Program at MIT, states that highly enriched uranium [HEU] is the “key element” in the production of a nuclear weapon;8 Daniel Poneman, senior fellow at the Forum for International Policy, remarks that “bomb-making is easier than getting the HEU”;9 the International Institute for Strategic Studies states that “from a nuclear proliferation standpoint, the most significant aspect of Iran’s nuclear programme is its development of…uranium enrichment technology”;10 former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explains that “heretofore, production of fissile material has been treated as by far the greatest danger”;11 and the New York Times argues that “perfecting the process of enriching uranium or making plutonium is far more difficult than designing warheads or building missiles to deliver the weapons.”

The NIE acknowledges that Iran continues to enrich uranium at “declared civil” facilities.13 Its refusal to include this “declared civil” enrichment activity in its definition of “nuclear weapons program,” however, erroneously suggests that such activity presents no proliferation threat. To appreciate the danger associated with Iran’s “declared civil” enrichment activities, it is necessary to understand the ease with which civilian enrichment can be diverted to the production of weapons-grade fissile material.

The technology used to enrich uranium is considered “dual-use” because it can be used to produce both civilian-grade nuclear fuel (low enriched uranium or LEU) and weapons- grade fissile material (highly enriched uranium or HEU).14 Iran insists that its enrichment activities are limited exclusively to the production of civilian-grade nuclear fuel. It is for this reason that the NIE declares “not to know whether [Iran] currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.”15
Uranium enrichment is the process by which uranium-235 (U-235) and uranium-238 (U- 238) isotopes—both present in raw uranium ore—are separated from each other.16 After the raw uranium is converted into the intermediate product uranium hexafluoride, spinning rotors in centrifuge tubes segregate the heavier U-238 from the lighter U-235 isotopes. Magnets and thermal currents then expel the U-238 as byproduct while the remaining U-235 is carefully removed and combined with U-235 streams from other centrifuges linked together in a cascade. This process continues until the desired concentration of U-235 is reached. When the concentration of U-235 reaches three to five percent (LEU grade) the product is considered sufficiently enriched to be used as nuclear reactor fuel. When the concentration of U-235 surpasses approximately ninety percent (HEU grade) it can be used in a nuclear weapon.
The centrifuge technology required to produce HEU for nuclear weapons is essentially the same as that required to produce LEU for nuclear reactor fuel.17 According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, no mechanical reconfiguration of Iran’s “declared civil” nuclear facilities would be necessary to transition from LEU production to HEU production—a process known as “nuclear breakout.”18 Iran could produce HEU simply by “recycling” the LEU product through the centrifuge cascade as feed.19 For a cascade configured to produce LEU from non-enriched uranium hexafluoride feed, only several additional cycles would be needed to yield HEU.20 Though this “rinse and repeat” process is not optimally efficient, experts estimate that failure to reconfigure would only add months to the breakout schedule.21 In other words, by mastering the LEU enrichment process technology at its “declared civil” plant, Iran will be capable of producing weapons-grade HEU at that facility or at a similar facility elsewhere.

As the discussion above underscores, the distinction drawn in the footnote to Key Judgment A between “covert” and “declared civil” nuclear activities is arbitrary and deceptive. In fact, the NIE explicitly acknowledges the breakout danger associated with Iran’s “declared civil” enrichment activity later in the report where it explains that “Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example, Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing.”23 The NIE also proclaims that “only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons.” It is difficult to reconcile these two statements with the headline finding that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. All uranium enrichment activities, including Iran’s “declared civil” enrichment, must be considered extremely proliferation-sensitive.

Weaponization

Weaponization entails the production of nuclear warheads and delivery devices. The NIE’s declaration that Tehran halted weaponization work in 2003 is inconsistent with the fact that Iran continues to develop dual-use military technology—that is, technology that can be used for either conventional or nuclear weapons. The NIE acknowledges this reality in Key Judgment D where it states that “Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.”25

Although the NIE reports that Iran halted development of missile delivery systems specifically designed to carry nuclear warheads, Iran continues to test sophisticated conventional missile systems. Iran possesses hundreds of Scud missiles and other short- range ballistic missiles, including the flight-tested Shahab-3, with a range of 1,300 kilometers.26 Iran tested its new Ashura missile in November of 2007—a 2000-kilometer- range weapon that could potentially reach U.S. allies in Southeastern Europe.27 In January 2008, Iran launched a research rocket into space, further demonstrating the advance of its missile technology.28 Modifying one of these conventional missiles to house a nuclear warhead would be substantially less difficult than enriching HEU or constructing an actual warhead.29

Iran also possesses knowledge, acquired before the supposed halt in 2003, that would allow it to weaponize rapidly. Between 2001 and 2003, for example, Iran attempted to modify its Shahab-3 missile to house an unidentified “black box” whose specifications closely match those of a nuclear warhead.30 Prior to 2003, Iran admitted to having conducted experiments with the chemical agent Polonium-210—a rare synthesized element used to construct the neutron initiating core of a typical nuclear warhead.31 The NIE acknowledges the advanced state of Iranian weapons technology, “assess[ing] with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.”32 Furthermore, in March 2008, IAEA representatives declassified a “trove of evidence” gathered from Iran’s military laboratories that revealed extensive Iranian research and experimentation “not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon.”
COMPARISON OF THE 2005 ASSESSMENT AND THE 2007 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The 2007 NIE was widely hailed as a repudiation of the intelligence community’s 2005 assessment of Iran’s nuclear program. The day after its release, for example, the New York Times led with a front-page article entitled, “How did a 2005 Estimate Go Awry?” while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed “victory against the great powers.”34 A close comparison of both assessments, however, leads to the conclusion that they are more similar than different.

The timelines contained within the 2005 and 2007 assessments, pertaining to both uranium enrichment and weapons production, are essentially identical. Key Judgment C of the 2007 NIE predicts that “the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but this is very unlikely” and judges “with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.”35 Similarly, the 2005 assessment states with “moderate confidence” that Iran is unlikely to produce a nuclear weapon “before early-to-mid next decade.”36

The 2007 NIE declares “not to know whether [Iran] currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.”37 Likewise, the 2005 estimate “expresses uncertainty about whether Iran’s ruling clerics have made a decision to build a nuclear arsenal.”38 The 2007 estimate clearly clashes with the Bush administration’s aggressive rhetoric and posture toward Iran. Similarly, the “carefully hedged [2005] assessments…contrast with forceful public statements by the White House.”39 The 2007 NIE concludes that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, but admits to having only “moderate confidence” that the suspension is still in force. Though the 2005 assessment mentions “credible indicators that Iran is conducting clandestine work,” it hedges this finding by stating that “there is no information linking those projects directly to a nuclear weapons program.”40 In other words, the 2005 NIE did not affirmatively conclude that Iran was engaged in nuclear weapons activity—at least as such activity is defined in the 2007 NIE.

There are two substantive differences between the 2005 and 2007 assessments. First, the 2005 assessment, unlike the 2007 NIE, considers the enrichment of HEU to be “the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon.”41 Second, the 2005 assessment judges that “left to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear weapons,” whereas the 2007 NIE asserts that “only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons.”42    In other words, the 2007 NIE states that Iran can, but might not, produce a nuclear weapon before 2015 whereas the 2005 assessment concludes that Iran can, and probably will, produce a nuclear weapon by that date. The real difference between the two assessments, therefore, “is not in the hard data but in the psychological assessment of the mullahs’ motives and objectives.”43

DECEPTIVE PRESENTATION AND THE MIXING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH POLICYMAKING

The NIE’s factual findings do not support the sea-change in public opinion that resulted from its publication. By opening with the bold proclamation that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, the NIE drafters ensured that the estimate’s subsequent conclusions would be largely ignored.44 That the headline finding is immediately qualified by a footnote which excludes Iran’s most prolific uranium enrichment activities lends credence to this argument. Why, then, did the U.S. intelligence community present the NIE in such a misleading manner?

One possible explanation is that the intelligence community intended for the NIE to influence public opinion and U.S. policy toward Iran. Immediately following publication of the NIE, Deputy Director of National Intelligence Donald M. Kerr, admitted that the assessment was intended to do more than provide policymakers with raw intelligence. According to the New York Times, Kerr stated that “since the new estimate was at odds with the 2005 assessment—and thus at odds with public statements by top officials about Iran—‘we felt it was important to release this information to ensure that an accurate presentation is available.’”45 This advocacy approach to intelligence reporting helps explain why the 2007 NIE—based on much of the same intelligence as the 2005 assessment—was presented in a way that led the public to believe that the underlying facts had changed dramatically.
The NIE is also misleading because it conflates intelligence reporting with policymaking. For example, it asserts “with high confidence that the halt…was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.”46 From this judgment, the NIE infers that Tehran “is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005” and “may be more vulnerable to influence on the issues than we judged previously.”47 As Henry Kissinger notes, these statements “blur the line between estimates and conjecture.”48 Perhaps, suggests Kissinger, the geopolitical context and American involvement in the region from 2003-2005 provide better explanations for changes in Iranian behavior.49 Moreover, the NIE’s prediction that some combination of international pressure and diplomatic compromise “might…prompt Tehran to extend the current halt of the nuclear weapons program,” even if true, reads more like a policy prescription than an intelligence estimate.50
Certain experts believe that the NIE was intended as a “preemptive strike” by the intelligence community on Bush administration officials pushing for military intervention in Iran.51 Iran expert Ray Takeyh, for example, views the NIE as part of a “larger narrative” in which “formal institutions of government determine[d] to resist the White House” in ways they did not during the run-up to the war in Iraq.52 Takeyh goes on to say that it was the intention of Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell to “undermine[] the president’s attempt to have a military option.”53 Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, goes even further, alleging that the NIE was drafted and approved by former State Department officials, recently transferred to the Directorate of National Intelligence, who held “relatively benign” views of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In Mr. Bolton’s opinion, these outsiders simply “recycled the policy biases they had before…as ‘intelligence judgments,’” presenting them as if they were “wisdom received from on high.”54
It is not necessary to subscribe to Mr. Bolton’s theory to acknowledge that the 2007 NIE was intended to influence public opinion and government policy. In fact, “Mr. McConnell told Congress [in February 2008] that he now has regrets about how the intelligence estimate was presented, saying it had failed to emphasize that Iran is moving ahead with the hardest part of any bomb project: producing the fuel.”55 In a February 2008 radio interview, McConnell backpedaled even further stating bluntly that, “Our estimate is [that] they intend to have a nuclear weapon.”56
The question that remains—and one that the 2007 NIE left explicitly unanswered—is whether Iran actually plans to develop nuclear weapons.57 An examination of how Iran would benefit from nuclear status leads to the conclusion that it does indeed intend to develop a nuclear arsenal.
HOW IRAN WOULD BENEFIT FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Iran is a medium-sized, pragmatic, and opportunistic power seeking to become the predominant state in its region. The NIE implicitly acknowledges this reality, stating that “Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit analysis rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs.”58 Although a “cost-benefit analysis does not exclude a rush to weapons on a systematic basis,” it does suggest that Iran would be very unlikely to use nuclear weapons offensively.59

It does not follow from this that the international community should ignore or excuse President Ahmadinejad’s assertions that Israel “be wiped off the map.”60 His aggressive rhetoric toward Israel combined with his disavowal of the Holocaust is a legitimate cause for concern in Tel Aviv and Washington.61 Moreover, Ahmadinejad is not the only Iranian politician to threaten the existence of Israel. In 2001, former President Rafsanjani remarked that it would only take one nuclear weapon to destroy the state of Israel whereas Iran could survive Israel’s retaliation.62 Even more disturbing is the fact that Rafsanjani is considered a top contender to succeed the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

Ahmadinejad’s belligerent rhetoric must, however, be understood in context. The nuclear issue and his opposition to the West serve to deflect attention from his dismal economic performance and unpopular social policies. His anti-Israeli rhetoric also helps win him acclaim on the Arab street at a time when many Arab leaders fear Persian ascendance.63 Despite Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric, Iran is highly unlikely to attack Israel. Israel possesses approximately two-hundred nuclear weapons, extensive second strike capability (including ballistic submarines), and intermediate-range missiles capable of reaching all of Iran’s major population centers.64

More realistically, Iran seeks nuclear weapons because of the “linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives.”65 Ray Takeyh summarizes the largely consensus belief that “Ahmadinejad and his allies view the acquisition of nuclear weapons as critical to consolidating Iran’s position and helping the country eclipse U.S. influence in the region…a prize worth suffering pain and sanctions to achieve.”66 More moderate Iranian leaders also recognize the strategic benefits of nuclear status.67 It is interesting to note, however, that Iran already enjoys a superior position vis-à-vis its neighbors. If an Iranian bomb were to spur a regional arms race, the result may be strategic parity between Iran and its smaller, weaker neighbors.
Iran might also value nuclear weapons for their deterrent capacity, though it is unlikely that a small nuclear arsenal would immunize Iran from conventional military attack. Israel’s nuclear arsenal, for example, did not prevent it from being attacked conventionally in the Yom Kippur War or during the 2006 conflict with Lebanon. Furthermore, U.S Cold War military planning and present-day war plans for a potential conflict with China, suggest that even large nuclear retaliatory capacity is not a perfect deterrent against conventional attack.68 Still, there is an “inordinate sense of paranoia” among the leaders in Tehran and nuclear weapons provide a better deterrent than any other type of technology.69
Nor should psychology be discounted in the nuclear calculus. Modern-day Iran is heir to the ancient Persian Empire—one of only three pre-colonial nations in the Middle East (along with Egypt and Turkey). The fact that Pakistan, a younger and—in the opinion of many Iranians—inferior country, possesses nuclear weapons is a mark of shame. Iran’s nuclear program is increasingly a matter of national pride, closely associated with the nation’s identity as a sophisticated global power.

PROOF OF IRAN’S INTENTION TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Before the release of the 2007 NIE, there was broad consensus in both the intelligence and academic communities that Iran’s nuclear program was not intended exclusively for peaceful purposes.70 Although the NIE called that conclusion into question, Iran’s long history of clandestine nuclear development, its record of forced and reactive diplomacy, and its refusal to halt enrichment activity in the face of Security Council sanctions suggest that it is determined to develop nuclear weapons.

Iran’s nuclear program began in the 1950s under the auspices of the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program and continued until the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Following the Revolution, many of the country’s nuclear scientists fled and Ayatollah Khomeini—who opposed nuclear development on religious grounds—showed little interest in reviving the program. Upon Khomeini’s death in 1989, the new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, embarked on an ambitious nuclear program with civilian and military applications.71 During the 1990s, Iran purchased nuclear equipment and material from China and Russia and obtained “aid packages” from A.Q. Khan’s black market nuclear supply network.72 Throughout this period, Iran went to great lengths to conceal the military component of its nuclear program.73

The election of the reform-minded President Khatami did little to alter the trajectory of Iran’s secret nuclear program, which remained under the close watch of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Iran began single-centrifuge enrichment experiments in the late 1990s and started constructing pilot and industrial-scale centrifuge installments soon after. During this period, Iran consistently informed the IAEA that it had no plans to develop an indigenous fuel cycle or enrich uranium domestically.74 At the same time, however, Iran “made no secret of its ambitions to build large rockets and warheads—with the explicit help of the North Koreans—that were ideally suited for delivering nuclear arms.”75

After eighteen years of secret nuclear development, Iran’s program was exposed in 2002 by a dissident exile group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran.76 Shortly thereafter, President Khatami acknowledged the existence of several nuclear sites but claimed that the nuclear program aimed only to produce LEU for civilian purposes.77 The IAEA issued a statement criticizing Iran for failing “to report material facilities and activities as required by its safeguards obligations,” but stopped short of threatening or censuring Tehran.78

Aware that it could not leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and still claim a legal right to enrich, Iran agreed to cooperate with the IAEA by allowing inspectors to visit certain nuclear facilities.79 Following these visits, the IAEA concluded that “Iran had failed to meet its obligation under its Safeguards Agreement.”80 Rather than strongly sanctioning Iran, as the United States advocated, the IAEA Board of Governors expressed concern over Iran’s failures, urged Iran to cooperate with IAEA inspectors, and encouraged Iran not to introduce fuel into the new enrichment cascades.81
On the heels of the Board’s statement, IAEA inspectors discovered that Iran’s nuclear activities were far more extensive than Khatami had disclosed. Inspectors reported that Tehran began its centrifuge program as far back as the mid-1980s and had purchased extensive designs and hardware from A.Q. Khan’s underground nuclear network.82 As a result, the IAEA demanded that Iran take “essential and urgent” actions to “ensure verification of compliance with Iran’s safeguards agreement”—namely the suspension of “all further uranium enrichment-related activities.”83

After threatening to withdraw from the NPT, Iran—faced with the prospect of a Security Council referral—partially relented. In a joint statement with the EU-3, Iran agreed to “engage in full cooperation with the IAEA…sign the IAEA Additional Protocol,” and “voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.”84 During this three-month voluntary suspension period, however, Iran’s centrifuge inventory actually increased by fifteen percent.85

Still unsatisfied with Iran’s cooperation, the EU-3 implicitly threatened Security Council referral again in January 2004. In response, Iran agreed to halt centrifuge activity “to the furthest extent possible.”86 Although, this agreement averted a diplomatic meltdown, it did little to slow Iranian nuclear progress. Within three months, Iran had assembled an additional 285 centrifuge machines, enough to complete its pilot centrifuge plant at Natanz.87

In September 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted another consensus resolution “deplor[ing]…the fact that Iran’s cooperation has not been as full, timely, and proactive as it could have been.”88 Iran responded by notifying the IAEA of its intention to resume manufacturing, assembling, and testing centrifuge technology.89 The same back-and-forth continued into November 2004 when Iran, again fearing referral to the Security Council, agreed to suspend “all enrichment related and reprocessing activities” and allow IAEA inspectors to place seals on certain nuclear equipment.90 In a surprising twist, the United States announced support for the EU-3 negotiations with Iran, thereby increasing pressure on Tehran.
Shortly after the election of President Ahmadinejad in August 2005, Iran declared its intention to remove the seals on its nuclear equipment and resume the enrichment activity it had previously foresworn.91 Eight months later, President Ahmadinejad announced, and the IAEA confirmed, that Iran had successfully enriched uranium past the LEU threshold (to 3.5 percent).92

After nearly four years of failed negotiations, the Security Council unanimously voted to sanction Iran, targeting the import and export of materials and technology used in uranium enrichment and weapons production.93 A second round of sanctions further restricting the import of nuclear-related products and freezing the financial assets of key Iranian officials was unanimously approved several months later.94 In March 2008, four months after the publication of the NIE, the Security Council voted to impose a third round of sanctions on Iran, authorizing the inspection of cargo suspected of containing nuclear equipment as well as travel bans and asset freezes on individuals and companies involved in Iran’s nuclear program.95

The Security Council sanctions have not had a significant impact on Iran’s nuclear policy. In fact, the production of fissile material has accelerated rapidly since 2006.96 IAEA Director General Mohammed El-baredei reported in November 2007 that Iran was successfully operating a (three-thousand centrifuge) cascade capable of producing enough HEU for a nuclear weapon in twelve months.97 Iran began operating a new generation of advanced IR-2 centrifuges in February 2008 which enrich uranium at more than twice the speed of the original centrifuges.98 As of November 2008, Iran was successfully operating five thousand centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear plant and had produced enough LEU (630 kilograms) to make a nuclear weapon if enriched further.99

In addition to Iran’s illicit nuclear history, there exist other indications of weapons intent. Iran has spent large sums of money to develop a domestic mining capacity even though “the depth of its ore deposits and the ore’s low uranium content, [mean that] the cost of yellowcake is likely to exceed current world market prices several times over.”100 Moreover, Iran’s indigenous uranium stores are sufficient to sustain a weapons program but inadequate to power even one civilian nuclear reactor.101 Amidst the uncertainty surrounding the future of its nuclear program after its revelation in 2002, Iran rushed to produce quantities of uranium hexafluoride grossly inadequate to power a fuel reactor but sufficient to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for six to eight simple implosion devices.102

The IAEA also possesses evidence which strongly suggests that Iran has experimented with nuclear weapons construction. At an emergency meeting convened by the United Nations nuclear inspector at IAEA headquarters in February 2008, the IAEA unveiled documents, sketches, and video of work conducted at Iranian laboratories that it said was “not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon.”103 Characteristically, the Iranians dismissed the evidence as “baseless and fabricated.”104

Lastly, it is revealing that the Ayatollah has blessed his country’s nuclear program by taking personal responsibility for its revival. Supreme Leader Khamenei associates Iran’s nuclear program with national pride and has asserted that when “the enemies wanted to take advantage of our temporary and voluntary suspension to undermine our nuclear program…I insisted that I would step in if they continued with their demand, and I did, and so our process began.”105
IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The NIE’s headline finding had an immediate and profound impact within the United States. As the New York Times noted, “Rarely if ever has a single intelligence estimate so completely, so suddenly and so surprisingly altered a foreign policy debate.”106 The estimate thoroughly delegitimized the Bush administration’s hawkish posture toward Iran. In the days following publication of the NIE, it became clear that the use of military force was no longer a viable policy option. It would have been inconceivable for the United States to attack a country that its own intelligence services said did not have a nuclear weapons program.107

The NIE also handicapped U.S. diplomatic efforts, making it more difficult to marshal international support for sanctions against Iran. Immediately after publication of the NIE, for example, China withdrew its approval for a third round of economic sanctions. Two weeks later, Russia delivered the first of eight batches of nuclear fuel for use in Iran’s Bushehr reactor.108 Although the Security Council eventually approved a third round of sanctions in March 2008, publication of the NIE significantly slowed diplomatic momentum on the nuclear issue.

The most interesting, and perhaps counterintuitive, consequence of the NIE was its impact within Iran. Although President Ahmadinejad hailed the NIE as a “victory against the great powers,” the ratcheting down of tensions actually served to weaken his internal standing.109 The nuclear issue and the specter of war with the United States were popular rallying cries for the Iranian leader. When the saber-rattling quieted in the NIE’s wake, Iranians began to focus more of their attention on Ahmadinejad’s glaring domestic failings.

Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005 promising to reinvigorate the economy and distribute oil revenues to Iran’s poor. Despite record oil prices in 2006 and 2007, however, his economic reforms resulted in failure. Annual inflation stands at thirty percent, one out of every four Iranians lives in poverty, and ninety percent of the population receives income from the state.110 Unemployment is also rampant; less than half of the one million young Iranians who enter the job market each year find work.111 These economic woes, combined with Ahmadinejad’s unpopular conservative social policies, have created widespread disaffection with his regime, especially among Iran’s young and relatively pro-Western population. The poor performance of Ahmadinejad’s party in the December 2006 Majlis elections and large-scale student protests throughout the country are signs of his declining popularity.

Publication of the NIE also exposed a growing rift between Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei, which suggests that the president no longer enjoys the same level of support from the Ayatollah that he received during his 2005 presidential run.112 The reduced threat of U.S. attack created the conditions necessary for these dormant political tensions to surface. In January 2008, National Security Council leader and close aide of the Ayatollah, Ali Larijani, was dispatched to Egypt—a country with which Iran does not have diplomatic relations—indicating that the Ayatollah is taking a more direct role in affairs usually reserved to the president. Four months later, Larijani—a political rival of Ahmadinejad—was elected Speaker of Parliament with the Ayatollah’s full backing.

These political schisms reflect a growing divide between members of the conservative “old right”—for whom Ahmadinejad is the standard bearer—and the “new right”— represented by conservative, yet pragmatic, figures such as Larijani.113 In the words of Ray Takeyh, the “new right” prizes “nationalism over Islamism, pragmatism over ideology.”114 One difference between these two factions is their position vis-à-vis the United States. Whereas diplomacy with Ahmadinejad has proven futile, it may be possible for the Obama administration to engage pragmatists like Larijani.115 In fact, Larijani—Iran’s former chief nuclear negotiator—has stated that “it may be that the U.S. is the enemy, but working with the enemy is part of politics.”116

Behind its sham democracy, absolute power in the Islamic Republic rests with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and his Council of Guardians. Any diplomatic progress with Iran on the nuclear issue would require the Supreme Leader’s approval. Although the Ayatollah’s personal virulence toward the United States is no secret, he has stated that Iran’s current lack of contact with the U.S. “does not mean that we will not have relations indefinitely.”117 Khamenei has also asserted that he “would be the first to approve resuming ties with the United States the day it is to the benefit of the nation.”118

POLICY PRESCRIPTION FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

The United States, in cooperation with the international community, must present Tehran a package of incentives and sanctions that convinces it to forego nuclear weapons development. The specific content of such a package is not discussed here. Rather, this paper is concerned with a more preliminary matter: creating the necessary preconditions for diplomatic progress. The proposal outlined below will in no way guarantee the success of any particular diplomatic strategy. In fact, at this late juncture, it is highly unlikely that any amount of diplomacy will succeed in persuading Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Refusal to adopt the following recommendations will, however, result in the certain failure of diplomacy.

First, the Obama administration must quietly convince the international community that the putative finding of the 2007 NIE is wrong, that Iran’s nuclear weapons program is ongoing, and that Tehran ultimately intends to produce nuclear weapons. Only if the international community believes that Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons will it rally behind an incentives-sanctions package that may convince Tehran to halt proliferation activities. There are promising indications that, despite the 2007 NIE, the international community still believes that Iran is driving forward with its nuclear weapons program. In March 2008, for instance, the IAEA presented compelling evidence that Iran remains engaged in activities “not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon.”119 Shortly thereafter, the Security Council voted nearly unanimously to authorize a third round of sanctions against Iran (only Indonesia abstained).
Second, the Obama administration must convince the international community that Iran should not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons. Although it is unlikely that Iran would use a nuclear weapon offensively, a nuclear Iran would unfavorably alter the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and increase instability in the region. To those countries—namely Russia and China—not particularly bothered by a geopolitical rearrangement in the Middle East, the Obama administration should emphasize that a nuclear Iran would represent the defeat of nonproliferation as a guiding norm of the international system. Iran’s successful production of a nuclear weapon might spur proliferation throughout the Middle East and beyond.120 Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, for example, would likely seek nuclear weapons to offset the Iranian threat (or demand broad U.S. security guarantees). Other states, including those not directly threatened by Iran, would draw the conclusion that the benefits of nuclear status outweigh the risks associated with disobeying international nonproliferation laws. Extensive proliferation, especially within developing nations in volatile parts of the world, would increase the risk of nuclear theft and black market sale, thereby raising the threat of nuclear terrorism.121

Lastly, the Obama administration must refrain from using highly charged rhetoric when speaking publicly to Iran. The use of threatening language has proven counterproductive with leaders in Tehran. President Bush’s hawkish rhetoric on the nuclear issue, for example, has not succeeded in slowing Iranian nuclear progress and has even helped to entrench Ahmadinejad’s domestically unpopular arch-conservative regime. If the Obama administration can keep tensions between the United States and Iran at current levels (and low oil prices continue to damage the Iranian economy), it is likely that Ahmadinejad and his fellow hardliners will be replaced in the June 2009 national elections by reformists or pragmatic conservatives more willing to engage diplomatically on the nuclear issue.

This is not to suggest that the Obama administration should tolerate Iran’s extensive proliferation activities. Plans for counterproliferation air and missile strikes must be developed and the costs and benefits of the use of military force should be vigorously debated behind closed doors within the Obama administration.122 In public, however, the Obama administration should emphasize the president’s oft-stated willingness to engage Tehran, while downplaying the possibility of military action. Direct diplomacy with the Ayatollah and more pragmatic Iranian leaders is the last best chance to avoid disaster. If talks ultimately fail, President Obama and the United States Congress will be forced to choose between two potentially catastrophic alternatives: accept an Iranian bomb or use military force to prevent Iran from going nuclear.

Matthew Jacobs is a J.D. Candidate at the New York University School of Law and an M.P.A. Candidate at the Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School.

[Spring 2008, Volume IX, Issue I]

Female suicide terrorism is on the rise worldwide. There were six suicide attacks known to have been perpetrated by women during the 1980s. Then, between 1990 and 2000, female suicide bombers committed 30 suicide attacks, and between 2000 and 2006, they committed over 40 suicide attacks. Female suicide bombers have detonated in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Russia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, and represent 15% of all suicide bombers.  In the past, the majority of scholarly attention has been given to suicide terrorism as a general phenomenon.  Suicide terrorism has been largely attributed to extremist religious or nationalist beliefs on an individual level, combined with the strategic advantages offered by suicide bombers on the group level in reaction to the external circumstances caused by a foreign occupation or a war. Conversely, the specific phenomenon of female suicide terrorism has not until recently received special attention. Within the past few years, though, the available information regarding female suicide bombers has advanced substantially.

By taking a closer look at female suicide terrorism, we have come to realize that over seven hundred people have died and two thousand have been injured by eighty-two female suicide bombers. These attackers have represented insurgent groups in Iraq; the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP) in Lebanon; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka; the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey; Chechen separatists in Russia; reportedly, al-Qaeda in Somalia; and Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Palestine.3 While many point to Islamic fundamentalism as a main cause for suicide terrorism, 85.4% of female suicide bombers acted on behalf of secular organizations rather than on behalf of religious ones, a point that will be addressed further below.

The fact that the number of female suicide bombers is steadily rising draws our attention to this topic. Unfortunately,  we currently lack the operational understanding of female suicide terrorism that would be necessary to curb female suicide terrorism. This article therefore addresses the question: “Under what conditions do terrorist organizations that launch suicide bombers use women for such attacks?” Since female suicide bombers are often believed to have significantly different motivations than male suicide bombers, this article also addresses the following sub-question: “why do individual women decide to become suicide bombers?” These two questions will allow us to place female suicide bombers in a context that not only considers the women’s personal motivations, but also the external factors (such as a foreign occupation or a war) that ultimately contribute to their decision to become ‘martyrs’.

It is vital to explore these issues because it is in the best interest of governments and individuals around the world (particularly those that are the targets of terrorist actions) to minimize the number of people who commit acts of suicide terrorism. We cannot hope to prevent these attacks until we know why they happen in the first place; consequently, it is necessary to understand both the individual and group motivations that lead to female involvement in suicide terror campaigns.

For example, if the main reason that female suicide bombings occur revolves around the individual motivations, while we likely would not be able to eradicate the root causes of such acts, we could at least begin to recognize signals and perhaps predict when or where these attacks would be likely. Conversely, if the main issues seem to lie at the group level rather than that of the individual, we could redirect our attention and efforts to concentrate on understanding the situation at that level. Overall, only with knowledge of all of the conditions that come together to cause female suicide terrorism can we begin to comprehend the issue on a global level and develop strategies to prevent such attacks. It is argued that two of the most important counterterrorism goals are to defeat the “current terrorists” and to prevent a “new generation” of terrorists from rising up. Since the use of female suicide bombers is a relatively new phenomenon, they could be considered to be this “next generation” of suicide bombers. To achieve the goal of preventing a new generation from rising up, a focus must be placed on female suicide terrorists in order to gain an understanding of the specific logic of that particular group’s involvement in campaigns of suicide terrorism. Further, if we understand the strategic and tactical reasons why women are being accepted into terrorist groups, we might be able to prevent women from successfully completing their suicide missions or predict which demographics may be likely candidates for the “new generation” of suicide bombers.

This article is organized as follows:

Scholarly work on this topic revolves around one main debate: whether female suicide terrorism is motivated primarily by internal or external factors. One school of thought argues that internal factors, such as the personal motivations listed below, are the main reason that women choose to become suicide bombers. However, it is also argued that the motivations for female suicide bombers are primarily external and that it is vital to place the stories of female suicide bombers into the appropriate context of war or foreign occupation. Following this logic, then, a woman who commits an act of suicide terrorism often has personal motivations, but would not have become a suicide bomber if her environment had not been one of conflict. In other words, it is not enough to have internal factors; there must also be external factors in place in order to yield female suicide terrorism.

Therefore, the first section explores the existing explanations of the internal factors that explain why individual women become suicide bombers. Reflecting common wisdom, Mia Bloom argues that female suicide bombers are typically motivated by personal reasons, while male suicide bombers are motivated by religious or nationalist fanaticism.

Some commonly cited personal motivations for female suicide bombers include:
• Societal pressure
• Inability or lack of desire to marry or bear
children
• Aspirations to achieve gender equality
• Desire to seek revenge for the loss of a loved one
• Harassment or embarrassment by opposition
forces
• Financial problems
• Any combination of these factors

For individual women, these personal motivations can be further sorted into the categories of “escapism” or “redemption.” Two women can be motivated by the same factor, such as the inability or lack of desire to marry or bear children, so it is essential to differentiate them based on their actual motivation (that is, to either escape their situation or to redeem themselves by committing an act of suicide terrorism). However, it is not always possible to sort the actual motivations into these two categories, since some women share the same problem or factor yet commit the act of suicide terrorism for different reasons.

Though many writers have focused on one particular group or the individual story of one suicide bomber, there is no single characteristic that unites all of the female suicide bombers. Additionally, these personal motivations cannot fully explain why women become suicide bombers, because although many women throughout the world face the same difficulties and challenges, they do not all become suicide bombers (e.g., many women are divorced or infertile, but very few become suicide bombers).

Thus, the second section of the article takes this issue to a higher level of aggregation and examines the external reasons for female suicide terrorism. This section considers the reasons why terrorist organizations utilize female suicide bombers. These group-level motivations can be split into two main categories: strategic advantages and tactical advantages.

Strategic advantages include women’s ability to:

• Capitalize on the glorification and admiration of
female suicide bombers
• Mobilize other potential suicide bombers into
action
Tactical advantages include the women’s ability to:
• Pass more easily through security checkpoints
• Feign pregnancy in order to avoid scrutiny
• Serve as accomplices to male suicide bombers
• Get closer to soft targets (for example, public figures whose deaths would have a strong impact
and receive a great deal of publicity)8

The strategic and tactical motivations listed above, if accurate, can be beneficial to terrorist organizations whose goals are to incite a societal reaction large enough to generate a following for their group or to scare as many people as possible. As such, these organizations must constantly develop new ways of attack to ensure that their target population never feels safe. Thus, the inclusion of female suicide bombers opens up another group of potential suicide bombers and makes it harder for security officials to screen for possible terrorists.

“[In Palestine], all four who died, plus the others who had tried and failed to die a martyr’s death, had personal problems that made their lives untenable within their own culture and society.” Some scholars consider female suicide bombers to be fundamentally different than male suicide bombers. In order to understand why this is the case, it is necessary to examine the factors that lead women to become martyrs and to determine whether (and, if so, how) these motivations differ from those of male suicide bombers. Some female suicide bombers may also harbor religious or political motives, but oftentimes those motives are downplayed in the media while personal reasons, which will be discussed below, are given center stage.

Regardless of each woman’s reasons for committing acts of suicide terrorism, it is important to note that the tendency of many authors has been to paint a picture of a woman witha plethora of problems who turns to suicide bombing to give meaning to her life. While men are portrayed as brave warriors fighting for a cause they passionately believe in, their personal problems that may have led them to become a suicide bomber are ignored or downplayed as reasons for their actions.

The actions of female suicide bombers tend to be interpreted as a way to either: 1) escape the factors that make them unhappy, or 2) to empower or redeem themselves in response to their problems. Overall, female suicide bombers are perceived to take their lives literally into their own hands in the face of societal pressure or personal problems.  However, it is important to note that there are varying degrees of societal pressure placed upon countless numbers of women in virtually every country. Therefore, while societal pressures including the inability to marry or have children or gender inequality may be strong factors that lead certain women to consider ‘martyrdom’, it is impossible to link any one of these conditions directly to martyrdom. Even when it is possible to connect the conditions to the outcomes, these conditions are necessary but not sufficient. In other words, women typically must have problems to become suicide bombers but not all women with problems do become suicide bombers; clearly there are also external factors that must be addressed in order to construct an accurate argument. This section will examine all of the personal factors that are cited as reasons why women choose to become suicide bombers.

Societal pressure in a general sense is often cited as a reason why women become suicide bombers. In Palestinian society, for example, women are generally expected to get married and have children, and when that expectation is not fulfilled, suicide bombing becomes an acceptable replacement as a contribution to society.

One Palestinian female suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, was a paramedic for the Red Crescent and cared for Palestinians injured by the Israelis. She is an example of a female suicide bomber who faced societal pressure, as one expert, Dr.Mira Tzoreff, explains:

“If we take Wafa Idris…the ultimate shahida [martyr], who is she after all? She is a talented young woman, married and divorced because she was sterile, desperate because she knew perfectly well there was no future for her in any aspect of the Palestinian society. She knew better than anyone else that the only way for her to come out against this miserable situation was to kill herself [emphasis added]…She knew her own society and the limitations they put on her and on women like her and she understood better than anyone else that she had nothing left, no hope, no future.

It seems, then, that Wafa saw suicide bombing as the only way out, because living in her society meant a life of unhappiness and unfulfilled potential, while the prospect of becoming a martyr held the promise of a better existence in the afterlife.

In fact, the cousin of Darine Abu Aisha, the second Palestinian female suicide bomber, believes that some women owe it to Palestine to become suicide bombers. Perhaps more importantly, she also believes that as mothers, Palestinian women must encourage their children to become suicide bombers. She explains, “I adore my children, but if I help them achieve martyrdom, it only means that Allah has chosen them because he loves them more than I do.”11 Thus, she believes that it is not only socially acceptable but encouraged for women to become martyrs or to raise their children to become martyrs. Divorce or the inability to bear children is frequently cited as a reason why women decide to become suicide bombers. For example, Wafa Idris, the Palestinian suicide bomber discussed above, was married at a young age to her first cousin, but could not conceive. Eventually, she did get pregnant, but gave birth to a stillborn infant. After that, Wafa became depressed and refused to do anything (such as cooking, cleaning, and other household tasks) and her husband, angry and frustrated, divorced her.12 After the divorce, her mother explains, “Wafa knew she could never marry again because a divorced woman is tainted…She was young, intelligent, and beautiful and had nothing to live for.” This story reflects an escapist motivation for ‘martyrdom’ and is representative of women who, unable to tolerate the idea of a future without a husband or children, choose to martyr themselves.

On the other hand, the second Palestinian female suicide bomber, Darine Abu Aisha, allegedly chose to become a martyr not because she could not marry, but because she did not want to marry. She had several prospects for marriage, all of which she turned down in order to concentrate on her studies, saying that “she had no intention of ever marrying because she had no intention of becoming a slave.”14 Darine’s cousin explains that Darine was teased and her family suffered because she did not want to marry. However, after her death her family was happy to find out that she had finally come to serve “a higher purpose.” They believe that Darine knew she would become “the bride of Allah in paradise.”15 The decision to become a martyr empowered Darine to perform a task viewed as more important than any earthly role she could have ever hoped to fill. Thus, the same factor (marriage) led to two very different outcomes. Wafa, who could not marry again, became a martyr to escape her life on earth. Conversely, Darine did not want to marry, so she became a martyr in an attempt to empower herself to be a part of something bigger than the role carved out for her by her society.

In many of the societies in which suicide bombings take place, women struggle for rights and recognition. Mia Bloom, author of the book Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, explains that according to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, African and Middle Eastern women suffer the most from gender inequality.16 As a result, the desire to achieve gender equality is sometimes cited as a reason why women commit acts of suicide terrorism. Clara Beyler writes, “When women become human bombs, their intent is to make a statement not only in the name of a country, a religion, a leader, but also in the name of their gender.” For example, Darine Abu Aisha’s best friend, Nano Abdul, believed that Darine became a ‘martyr’ because she had gone as far as she could within her society. Even though she was extremely bright and attended university, “her fate as a Palestinian woman was sealed – an arranged marriage, six or seven children, a husband who probably wouldn’t have the same hopes or curiosity about life that she did.”18 As a result, she chose to martyr herself to escape her certain fate on earth. Therefore, the aspiration to achieve gender equality is another factor that helps to explain Darine’s desire to become a suicide bomber.

Furthermore, many of the women who become suicide bombers are either recruited or “handled” by men. Thus, one could argue that women are still being categorized and treated as subordinates rather than being empowered. Even though these women are being “allowed” to make what they view as a great sacrifice, in the end, they are being sent off to die by men, perhaps in the place of men. This suggests that their lives continue to be valued less than those of the men, which directly contradicts the argument that women are able to achieve gender equality as a result of their actions. Clara Beyler asserts that in some groups, such as the Palestinian Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades or the Chechen rebels, female suicide bombers do not achieve gender equality because they are not given the same opportunities to participate in the terrorist group as men are. However, there are groups, such as the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey or the Tamil Tigers of Liberation Eelam in Sri Lanka, which do allow women to play an active role in the terrorist organizations. In those cases, suicide terrorism is arguably “the next logical step” of involvement.

For example, during the period of 1980-2003, ten of the PKK’s fourteen suicide attacks (71%) were carried out by women. The PKK case is unique because it is believed that none of their suicide bombers were walk-in volunteers; the men and women who committed acts of suicide terrorism on behalf of the PKK were “long-serving members” of the group.21 These facts do support the idea that women formed part of the group and were not recruited for the sole purpose of becoming suicide bombers.

However, this case does not necessarily reflect gender equality. There were more women than men deployed to martyr themselves (ten women as opposed to four men). This may actually suggest that men are more highly valued within terrorist organizations and, as a result, the women are sent to die instead. Though the fact that so many women were “allowed” to die could be seen as a reflection of gender equality, it could also be viewed as gender inequality since they are martyred at a higher rate than the men.

Another group that has used female suicide bombers is Hezbollah. From 1982 to 1986, six women carried out suicide attacks on behalf of Hezbollah against American, French, and Israeli forces in Lebanon. These women represented 16% of the 37 total suicide attackers whose gender was identified.22 It is important to note that during this period, most suicide bombers were volunteers, not part of the group. As a result, it is possible that the numbers of men and women who became suicide bombers are not a result of the choices made by Hezbollah, but rather a reflection of simple supply and demand. Rather than reflecting any sort of gender bias, these data may simply illustrate the numbers of men and women who volunteered for suicide missions.

In many of the cases, a connection can be made between a female suicide bomber and a male loved one (such as a brother, a cousin, an uncle, a fiancé, or a father) that died in a particular conflict. This factor is most effectively illustrated by the Chechen case. Within that society, there is an entire group of female suicide attackers called the Black Widows who are said to become suicide bombers for the sole purpose of seeking revenge for the loss of family members killed as a result of Russian military action.23 For, example, in November 2001, a Chechen woman named Elza Gazuyeva killed herself and the Russian commander who was believed to have ordered the death of Elza’s husband in a suicide attack.24 Though she empowered herself to take revenge against the man she believed had ordered her husband’s murder, it is also possible that she was attempting to escape life without her husband. It is impossible to definitively identify whether she was trying to escape or empower herself, but either way, it does seem that her husband’s death was at least part of the reason she became a suicide bomber.

However, while these women are no doubt devastated by the loss of their loved ones, this factor alone cannot explain their actions. For example, even though the number of people killed during the First and Second Chechen Wars (1994-1996 and 1999-present, respectively) is widely disputed, the number of women who have become suicide bombers is much smaller. One Chechen official said on August 15, 2005, that between 150,000 and 160,000 people had died or gone missing over the course of those conflicts.25 Robert Pape, on the other hand, writes that from 2000-2003, 1.1 million people comprised the Chechen occupied population, while 50,000 deaths had occurred as a result of military presence (a rate of 50 deaths per 1,000 people). However, there were a total of 33 suicide attacks, and less than 14 suicide attacks perpetrated by females. Thus, for every 1,000 deaths related to the military presence, less than one suicide attack was committed by male and female suicide bombers combined.26 By examining this data, it becomes evident that this explanation alone is not sufficient because though many women have lost loved ones in this particular conflict, very few have reacted by becoming, suicide terrorists.

In some cases, women are believed to have been led to suicide terrorism as a result of harassment or embarrassment by members of opposition forces. Dr. Iyad Sarraj, a Palestinian psychiatrist from Gaza who has studied the phenomenon of suicide, explains: “The children who threw stones and Molotov cocktails and confronted Israeli soldiers in 1987 and who watched their fathers and other male relatives being beaten and humiliated by Israeli forces, are the young men [and women] who are the martyrs of today.”27 By this logic, as a response to past mistreatment, these people may become suicide bombers to empower themselves against the enemy.

Nowadays, in some conflict zones, women are humiliated as they pass through checkpoints. In one case, a Palestinian woman was forced by an Israeli officer to wait an hour to pass through the checkpoint and suffered verbal abuse and offensive sexual advances made by the guards while she waited. After describing that incident, the woman said that she felt that “[l]ife is worth nothing when [we] are being humiliated on a daily basis.”28 When the women feel this way, their decision to become suicide bombers allows them to escape this daily humiliation and to take revenge.

Another example of humiliation by the opposition forces is the story of Darine Abu Aisha, who was discussed in previous sections of this article. On one occasion, Darine got very upset because soldiers at a checkpoint would not let a sick infant pass. When she tried to convince them to allow the infant to pass through, the soldiers told her that they would – if Darine kissed her cousin Rashid on the mouth. This incident was so severe that the two would have to marry because after having kissed her cousin, she would not be able to marry anyone else. Since Darine did not want to get married, Rashid promised to help her find another solution that would empower her to change the course of her life and protect the family’s honor, and that is how she is said to have started down the path to martyrdom. However, the abuses of opposition forces do not end with the spoken word. Both Tamil and Kurdish women have been known to join the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers Party), respectively, because they were raped by members of the Sinhalese or Turkish military.30 Mia Bloom writes, “What is incredibly compelling about delving into how and why women become suicide bombers is that so many of these women have been raped or sexually abused in the previous conflict either by the representatives of the state or by the insurgents themselves.”31 In these cases, the women could be motivated by either escapism (to escape humiliation or scorn) or redemption (to take action against the enemy) in order to become martyrs.

Rape is unfortunately a frequent occurrence during wars and is typically viewed as a negative consequence of conflict. However, rape has only led to female suicide terrorism in a handful of contexts in which suicide terrorism was already taking place. Since in many societies rape precludes a woman from marriage and compromises her honor, the combination of the internal anguish caused by rape and the external factor of an already-existent suicide terror campaign can come together to yield an act of female suicide terrorism – if a woman believesthat her act will lead to redemption. Therefore, in order for a female suicide bomber to martyr herself in hopes of redemption, the precedent must be set by someone who comes before her. In other words, if suicide terrorism is already occurring within a conflict, and a rape victim sees that previous martyrs have been glorified, she may be likely to see martyrdom as a path to redemption.

There is little strong evidence that financial motivations drive female suicide terrorism. For example, in Chechnya, one woman agreed to become a suicide bomber because the Chechen rebels promised to pay her relatives $1,000 to compensate for the cost of the jewelry that the woman had stolen from her family. However, this woman decided at the last minute not to complete her mission and turned herself in to the Russian police.33 It is clear that this woman was desperate for money – but not desperate enough to kill herself. Even though this woman did not go through with her assignment, it is worth noting that she was, at least temporarily, willing to commit an act of suicide terrorism in order to repay a $1,000 debt. This story is one example of a would-be martyr reneging on her agreement with the terrorist organization, and it shows that financial motivations may not be a strong enough factor to lead a woman to kill herself.

Though it is difficult to imagine placing a value of a thousand dollars on human life, Dr. Emanuel Savin, an expert in terrorism, believes that economic factors are very influential in the decision-making process of potential bombers. Due to the dire circumstances in which many Palestinians find themselves as a result of the Israeli occupation, suicide bombing offers a way for women to take control of their family’s fate and earn money for their families.34 Even though a large amount of this money did not go directly to the families, they still received about 10%, and considering the per capita income is $1,000 per year on average, it is conceivable that a family would sacrifice a child to attain financial security – especially if they believe that their child will live on forever in Paradise. Saddam Hussein gave $25,000 rewards to the families of each martyr, plus $25,000 to re-build houses destroyed by the Israeli army (which were destroyed to discourage future suicide bombers).36 However, Israeli forces do not solely destroy the homes of suicide bombers. In response to less than 100 suicide attacks, Israeli forces destroyed approximately 500 houses. As a result, many more families suffered as a result of the suicide bombers’ actions and ostensibly did not receive financial compensation for the destruction of their homes.

Interestingly, Dr. Abul Aziz al-Rantisi, spokesperson for Hamas, admitted during an on-camera interview that male suicide bombers’ families are paid $400 per month, whereas the families of female suicide bombers receive half that amount. This money is paid each month for a lifetime to the families by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or the Palestinian authority, depending on who takes responsibility for the attack.38 Despite the fact that they are completing the same task and dying for the same cause, female suicide bombers only receive half the amount of money that their male counterparts do. If men are paid twice as much as women, but the money is not typically named as a motivating factor for male martyrs, it is difficult to believe that financial problems on their own serve as motivation for women. Additionally, if a family desperately needs money, it would be more economically advantageous to send a son instead of a daughter to become a martyr.

Thus, while the financial aspect certainly may contribute to a woman’s decision to become a martyr, it seems that this reason is, at best, a secondary one. Without at least one other personal issue or problem present, it seems that even if a woman did enter into an agreement with a terrorist organization solely in order to earn money, she would be likely to renege on the agreement just as the Chechen woman did. However, if the woman presents other problems in addition to financial concerns, she may be more inclined to take into account the fact that her family will receive a fairly large sum of money upon her death and ultimately decided to become a martyr.

Though all of the factors above, along with countless others, may be offered as explanations for the actions of female suicide bombers, it must be recognized that no single factor directly leads to suicide terrorism. Mia Bloom, who over the course of her book discusses many of these factors in extreme detail, acknowledges that, “Motives vary: revenge for a personal loss, the desire to redeem the family name, to escape a life of sheltered monotony and achieve fame, and to level the patriarchal societies in which they live…”39 However, in cases like Darine’s, we can see that a combination of life experiences and personal problems can come together to incite a woman to action. It was not just the incidence of humiliation at the checkpoint, or just the fact that she did not want to get married, or just the fact that she was being forced to marry her cousin. She became a suicide terrorist because of all of these reasons and possibly others as well. It is extremely difficult to ascertain the precise motivations of any suicide bomber because we oftentimes must rely on the insight of friends and family after she commits her act of martyrdom.

The length of the above list is indicative of a wide variety of personal motivations, and though many writers have focused on one particular group or the individual stories of each suicide bomber, there is no single characteristic that forms a nexus between all of the female suicide bombers. Additionally, these personal motivations cannot fully explain why women become suicide bombers, because though countless women throughout the world face similar circumstances or problems, very few of them become suicide bombers (the world’s current population includes approximately two billion women above the age of fifteen, but only eighty-two women have successfully completed suicide terrorist attacks.) In order to fully comprehend this issue, we need to examine it considering the external factors that lead terrorist groups to employ women. Since the decisions of terrorist organizations are founded upon concrete strategic and tactical goals associated with eliciting a particular reaction from their enemies, evaluating these factors provides a more fruitful and objective way of arriving at a feasible explanation.  “Bombers work as parts of organizations, rarely as individuals. These organizations and their roles in the bombing must be understood.

Some experts believe that we should view suicide bombers as guided missiles, carefully prepared and launched by some larger, organized group, instead of picturing them as driven to kill themselves and others out of a spontaneous surge of emotion.”

Religion is often cited as the main motivation for suicide terrorism. Therefore, before discussing the specific strategic and tactical advantages that terrorist organizations may enjoy as a result of female suicide terrorism, it is essential to understand the role that religion plays in determining whether women are allowed to become suicide terrorists. The first female suicide bomber, Sana’a Mehaydali, was a 17-year-old girl “sent by the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP/PPS), a secular, pro-Syrian Lebanese organization, to blow herself up near an Israeli convoy in Lebanon in 1985.”43 Since then, however, there have been eighty-one suicide bombings perpetrated by women worldwide who represent both secular and religious groups. Islam is the religion that is typically linked to suicide terrorism. In actuality, only three of the groups that use female suicide bombers are religiously oriented: Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Al-Qaeda, and these groups are Islam-based. However, both Hamas and the PIJ initially rejected the use of women for suicide attacks. The reason they began accepting female suicide bombers is because the public response was “overwhelmingly positive” and they believed that great strategic gains could be made by utilizing women.

It is clear, then, that suicide terrorism cannot be explicitly linked to religious motivations. In fact, out of the nine groups that have used female suicide bombers, six are secular (the Syrian Socialist National Party, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, the Chechen separatists, and the Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades).Of all the women who have committed suicide attacks, 85.4% commit them on behalf of secular groups. Since religious groups tend not to use women, some argue that these groups do not believe that women are worthy of martyrdom. Following that logic, then, groups that do use women may be seen as more egalitarian. However, one could also argue that the reason religious groups use women is because women are seen as less important than men and should thus be sent to die in the place of men.

It is impossible to ascertain which mentality these groups have and thus the religious versus secular examination of the involvement of women as suicide terrorists is not productive. Women who choose to become suicide bombers are likely to follow through with their decision regardless of which organization is sponsoring them, and oftentimes it contributes to the strategic and social goals of a terrorist group (whether secular or religious) to accept responsibility for a female suicide bomber’s attack.

Thus, since we cannot generalize female suicide bombings as being particular to either secular or religious agendas, it is clear that something else is happening on an organizational level that has led groups to accept females as suicide terrorists. In order to examine these group-level motivations, we must first understand why terrorist organizations use suicide terrorism at all. Then, we must examine the specific factors that explain why some terrorist organizations employ female suicide bombers.

In a general sense, Pape states that the purpose for suicide terrorism is, “to use the threat of punishment to compel a target democracy to change policy, and most especially to cause democratic states to withdraw forces from land the terrorists perceive as their national homeland.” He goes on to argue that suicide terrorism is a strategy of coercion that attempts to force the target government to make policy changes.48 The crux of Pape’s argument is that democracies are “soft” and thus have populations who “have low thresholds of cost tolerance.” As a result of the public’s low tolerance for fatalities, especially civilians, suicide terrorists are able to affect the policies of democratic states.49 As of 2003, when Pape published his book, every population that had been targeted by a modern suicide bombing campaign was a democracy (the United States, France, Israel, India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Russia). As a result, Pape makes a strong argument regarding the connection between the use of suicide terror and the willingness of democratic states to give in to “modest or very limited goals,” though thus far suicide terrorism “has…failed to compel target democracies to abandon goals central to national wealth or security.”

For the purposes of this article, it is vital to take into consideration the specific advantages that the use of female suicide bombers provides terrorist organizations. While all suicide bombers have an impact on the target populations, many scholars argue that female suicide bombers provide a particular advantage because the idea of a woman committing such severe acts of violence is seen as especially reprehensible. To use Pape’s terms, the “cost tolerance” is seen as being lower within some societies when women are involved in the attacks due to the preconceived notions of what a woman’s role in society should be.

Because the number of female suicide bombers is so much lower than the number of male suicide bombers, their specific strategic advantage (e.g. if the use of female suicide bombers allows terrorist organizations to demand more extreme actions or concessions from the target democracy) has not been examined thus far in depth. There are many factors that help to explain why it may be beneficial for terrorist organizations to employ female suicide bombers.

Some of the reasons commonly given to explain why terrorist groups use women include:
• The especially strong societal reaction to female martyrs
• The glorification of martyrs
• The ability of female martyrs to shame or inspire others to join the cause
• The ability of women (especially those who feign pregnancy) to use societal taboos to avoid searches or scrutiny
• The ability of women to serve as accomplices to male suicide bombers
• The fact that women can access soft targets

Some of these advantages, such as the glorification of martyrs and the ability of female martyrs to inspire others, are arguably equally relevant to male suicide bombers. Due to specific gender-related factors, though, the impact of females is argued to be significantly different. Since women may be viewed in the countries affected by suicide terrorism as weak or inferior, they may become role models not only because they are suicide bombers, but because of their gender, and are therefore entitled to a more highly glorified status. This argument will be expanded upon below and will be split into two sections: strategic advantages and tactical advantages.

Mia Bloom explains, “Suicide attacks are done for effect, and the more dramatic the effect, the stronger the message; thus a potential interest on the part of some groups in recruiting women.”52 Suicide bombers in general inspire fear and shock within the target population; however, in societies where women are viewed as weak and subordinate to men, the “shock value” of a female suicide bomber is especially large. Rhiannon Talbot of the University of Newcastle in the United Kingdom adds, “All of these women undermine our idea of who and what a terrorist is. Our intuitive assumptions presume that terrorists and terrorism are a man’s preserve. Most people still believe that women would not kill in such a barbaric and indiscriminate way that targets innocent children equally with soldiers or police officers. This is why there is usually a public outcry of horror against women terrorists.”

The case of Wafa Idris supports this idea that female martyrs can cause a strong societal reaction. In an editorial praising her actions was published in Al-Sha’ab, an Egyptian Islamist weekly. This editorial deserves a close examination as it details the strategic benefits that can be enjoyed by a terrorist organization as a result of a female suicide attack.

The editorial begins:
“It’s a woman!! A woman, oh men of the [Islamic] nation; a woman, oh youth of the nation; a woman, oh women of the nation; a woman, oh those who call for the liberation of the nation’s women; a woman, oh soldiers of the nation; a woman, oh rulers, princes, and leaders of this nation; it is a woman, a woman, a woman.”

From this introduction, we can clearly see that the author is not referring to martyrdom as a general phenomenon; rather, the author is drawing attention to the fact that the author believes the fact that the bomber is female is an integral part of the reason she should be praised.

Continuing, the author writes:

“It is a woman who teaches you today a lesson in heroism, who teaches you the meaning of Jihad, and the way to die a martyr’s death. It is a woman who has inscribed, in letters of fire, the battle of martyrdom that horrified the heart of the enemy’s entity. It is a woman who has shocked the enemy, with her thin, meager, and weak body… It is a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded all the myths about women’s weakness, submissiveness, and enslavement.”

“It is a woman who today teaches you, oh Muslim women, the meaning of true liberation, with which the women’s rights activists have tempted you… It is a woman who has now proven that the meaning of [women’s] liberation is the liberation of the body from the trials and tribulations of this world… and the acceptance of death with a powerful, courageous embrace…”

“It is a woman, a woman, a woman who is a source of pride for the women of this nation and a source of honor that shames the submissive men with a shame that cannot be washed away except by blood… It is a woman in the spring of her youth who swore in the name of her God, with every drop of her blood, with every limb of her body, and with every one of her cells that turned into coals that burned the hearts of the enemy with the fire of fear, loss, and pain…“

In the body of this editorial, the author points out that Wafa had a particularly strong impact on the enemy because she was a female who committed this act of martyrdom. The author argues that Wafa breaks the stereotype for her gender, allowing women to be seen as liberated, empowered, and capable of fighting alongside men to achieve a set goal. According to the author’s logic, Wafa should serve as a role model for Muslim women and should shame the men who are not active participants in the conflict.  Barbara Victor confirms that the general societal reaction to Wafa’s death aligns with the opinion asserted in the editorial above. While researching for her book, Victor visited Wafa’s home and was greeted by a crowd of people who, regardless of age or gender, praised Wafa, happy “that one of their own had become a heroine for the Palestinian struggle – a woman, a symbol of the army of women who were ready to die for the cause.”56 For them, Wafa was not merely a suicide bomber; rather, she was a hero, a model that all Palestinian women should aspire to emulate. Of course, male martyrs also elicit a societal reaction, and it is impossible to quantify which gender elicits a stronger societal reaction. This factor only reflects the perception that women get more attention, which may or may not be correct. However, a terrorist group may believe that a female suicide bomber is useful if there is simply a chance that she could receive more attention than a man.

Continuing along those lines, it is also difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether female martyrs are more glorified than male martyrs. In Palestine, posters of both male and female martyrs are posted around their towns, leaflets about the terrorist organization that sponsored them are distributed, and people celebrate in the streets. In Sri Lanka, community support is cited as one of the main reasons that so many individuals are willing to commit suicide attacks on behalf of the Tamil Tigers. Before their death, the bombers’ identities are hidden, but after their deaths, their identities are publicized and annual public ceremonies are held to celebrate the martyrs. Both male and female suicide bombers are glorified in this way.

The case of Wafa Idris illustrates the glorification of a female martyr. After becoming a martyr, Wafa’s picture was posted all over the city and her mother distributed sweets to the children of the neighborhood in a widespread celebration of her actions. The press and the public compared Wafa to Jesus Christ, the Mona Lisa, and Joan of Arc, allowing her to become an instant celebrity upon her death and providing inspiration to other young women who would dream of one day becoming suicide bombers.

In the media and in propaganda, terrorist organizations are argued to benefit greatly from women who martyr themselves. A special emphasis may be placed upon female suicide bombers because the idea that a woman would go against tradition and kill herself in the name of their cause is very powerful and draws special attention to the issue. As a result, some terrorist groups may be inclined to recruit women because “[s]uicide attacks are done for the effect, and the more dramatic the effect, the stronger the message.”60 The effect of female suicide bombers may be more dramatic, especially in more conservative societies, and thus the use of women would provide a specific strategic benefit to the terrorist organization that sponsors her.

Furthermore, it is argued that “…this tactic makes them appear more threatening since it has erased the barriers between combatants and noncombatants, terrorists, and innocent civilians.” Following this logic, the target population becomes even more fearful in reaction to female suicide bombers because the line between combatant and noncombatant becomes blurred. At that point, anyone could potentially be an attacker. This allows the terrorist organization to achieve the specific goals of shocking the enemy and causing fear in the target population. Additionally, it may help the group to recruit new members and, if membership is low, to incite other people into joining their ranks. Female suicide bombers can potentially both shame men into joining the cause and inspire other women to become martyrs, a factor which will be discussed further below.

As mentioned previously, it is extremely challenging, if not impossible, to quantify the glorification of suicide bombers. Therefore, the argument that female suicide bombers attract more attention or are more highly glorified is not necessarily correct or incorrect, but simply not possible to verify. However, by doing a Lexis-Nexis search of the first four Palestinian female suicide bombers which Barbara Victor discusses in her book, and then a search of four Palestinian male suicide bombers, we can begin to see which gender gets more attention within the press.

This sample may prove helpful since male and female suicide bombers with similar numbers of casualties and similar attack dates are examined, so we can begin to isolate the gender variable and determine whether being a woman helps a suicide bomber to attract media attention. Of course, this is an imperfect model because it only considers a small sample of all Palestinian suicide bombers and does not take into account news coverage that is not published in English.

This data set somewhat supports the argument that women receive more press coverage than men during the month following their suicide attack. The first Palestinian female suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, killed one person and received 45 hits in a General News (Major Papers) search.  A male suicide bomber, Safwat Khalil, who detonated two days earlier and killed one person as well, only received one hit. Since Wafa Idris was the first female suicide bomber, her case may be special not necessarily because of her gender, but because her action represented something “new” in the field of terrorism.  The next Palestinian female suicide bomber, Darine Abu Aisha, who killed two people, received ten hits, while a male suicide bomber who also killed two people 11 days prior only received one hit.  Ayat al-Akhras, the third Palestinian female suicide bomber, especially supports the argument that women receive more attention than men. She killed two people, yet received 12 hits; a male suicide bomber who detonated two days before lher and killed 28 people received only two hits. Though unlike the other cases, the number of people killed by this set of suicide bombers was not similar, this suggests that female suicide bombers may receive more media attention than male suicide bombers, regardless of the number of people killed by their attacks.  The fourth Palestinian female suicide bomber, Andalib Suleiman Takata, does not support the argument that women
receive more attention. Although she killed six people (more than the combined total number of people killed for the three female suicide bombers that came before her), she did not receive any hits in the General News (Major Papers) search. A male suicide bomber, on the other hand, two days earlier killed  seven people and received ten hits.

This could be explained by the difficulty in searching all possible variations on her name.  However, Victor explains that her case did not receive a lot of media attention because she had no “sensational story”, but was simply “easily swayed and….caught up in her own fantasy of stardom.”  In all of the cases, the World News – Middle East and Africa (Major Papers) results showed fewer discrepancies between males and females than the General News (Major Papers) searches did.  It is hard to determine the reason why this is the case, but it may be due to the fact that many of these names have a variety of spellings, or may have been misspelled by some media sources.  Though on the whole this data set does seem to support the thesis that female suicide bombers receive more media ttenation than male suicide bombers, the limited size of the data set and the possible varied spellings of martyr names make it impossible to decisively conclude if that is actually the case. Moreover, the press coverage given to suicide bombers does not necessarily reflect public opinion, so it is impossible to tell whether men or women are more glorified within a society.  Some authors believe that one of the most important aspects of the glorification of martyrs is that these female suicide bombers may be used to mobilize others into action. When women are used, it is argued that they not only inspire other women to take action, but also shame men into participating.
This occurs in a variety of cases, one example being: “A propaganda slogan in Chechnya [that] reads: “Women’s courage is a disgrace to that of modern men.” Another example is that “[b]efore Ayat Akras blew herself up, she taped her martyrdom video and stated, ‘I am going to fight instead of the sleeping Arab armies who are watching Palestinian girls fighting alone,’ in an apparent jab at Arab leaders for not being
sufficiently proactive or manly.”  It is possible that some suicide bombers are inspired by the acts of the martyrs that died before them. For example, Andalib Suleiman Takata, the fourth Palestinian female suicide
bomber, was fascinated by suicide bombers and had pictures of martyrs taped all over her walls.68 Andalib “believed that dying as a shahida would transform her into an instant superstar.” After Ayat al-Akhras martyred herself, Andalib went to her Ayat’s home and talked to a man that could help her become a martyr. She told him that she wanted to do what the other three girls had done, and sadly, she killed more
people than those three girls combined.  However, it is difficult to discern a causal link between the inspiration provided by one martyr and the actions of  another. Andalib was not only influenced by other female suicide bombers, but was also extremely angry because she had watched her father and brothers suffer humiliation at the hands of the Israel military. Therefore, though a person may be inspired by a suicide bomber, if personal problems are not present, it seems unlikely that that person would become a
suicide bomber solely because of that inspiration. From the perspective of the terrorist organization, though, perhaps even the possibility that female martyrs will inspire others to join their ranks is worth the effort of training a woman and allowing her to carry out an attack.  One frequently cited reason that terrorist organizations use female suicide bombers is that women provide a tactical advantage. Females can more easily pass through security checkpoints and may not face the high level of scrutiny to which males are subject (especially in conservative societies in which physical searches of women are often seen as particularly offensive). According to Bloom, Israel’s restrictive checkpoints and border policy proved
fairly effective against Palestinian insurgent organizations inside the Occupied Territories. Since the mid
1990s, it has been almost impossible for unmarried men under the age of 40 to get legitimate permits to cross the border into Israel – for any reason. Terrorist groups have therefore looked further afield for volunteers including women and even children. Women don’t arouse suspicion like men and blend in more effectively with Israeli citizens [emphasis added]. Attacks perpetrated by women have tended to be those where the terrorist planners needed the perpetrator to blend in on the Israeli “street.” These female terrorists…westernize their appearance, adopting modern hairstyles and short skirts. The use of the least-likely suspect is the most-likely tactical adaptation for a terrorist group under scrutiny. This quote suggests that allowing women to become martyrs was necessary in order to ensure the success of suicide terrorist
attacks. To be able to achieve their strategic goals (that is, to cause the greatest number of casualties possible and to instill the maximum amount of fear in the target population), groups had to adapt because men drew too much attention or were sometimes unable to cross through checkpoints. Consequently, they began to use “the least-likely suspect,” women, so that they could continue to execute successful suicide attacks. According to O’Rourke, on average, women do have a higher average number of victims than men (9.7 versus 3.6 killed).  However, she points out that this discrepancy is largely due to the higher effectiveness of Chechen women as opposed to Chechen men.  Terrorist organizations have also developed a clever strategy that allows female suicide bombers to cause the most casualties possible. This strategy, which has been used by several terrorist organizations to deflect suspicion from females, is
the use of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), frequently referred to as a “suicide belt,” to feign pregnancy.  This photo shows an Improvised Explosive Device that could used to commit an act of suicide terrorism.  In those cases, the women are particularly immune to searches because they are not only women, but also seemingly pregnant. This allows them to pass through security checkpointsand into crowded areas even more easily than women who do not appear to be pregnant without raising suspicion.
Mia Bloom explains, “To complicate the notions of femininity and motherhood, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is often disguised under the woman’s clothing to make her appear as if she is pregnant and thus beyond suspicion or reproach. The advent of women suicide bombers has transformed the revolutionary womb into an exploding one.” In one case, a thirty-four year old woman posed as the pregnant wife of a Sri Lankan soldier in order to gain access to a military hospital within a secure complex. Her gender combined with her apparent “pregnancy” allowed her to pass through those security checkpoints without arousing suspicion.76 The first female suicide bomber died in 1985, yet women continue to successfully commit suicide attacks. This suggests that even after years of experience with female suicide bombers, security officials are hesitant to search women (especially pregnant ones) because that practice is seen as offensive and improper.
However, some countries, such as Israel, have responded to suicide attacks and have trained security officers to detect suspicious behavior in both men and women. Additionally, one company developed a laser device designed to detect explosives or chemical weapons from a distance. In countries that have been targets of suicide attacks, efforts have been made to train security personnel and develop antiterrorist
technologies. It is clear that educational methods and technology are being developed to help detect potential suicide bombers and prevent them from completing their missions. Additionally, women are sometimes used as accomplices to male suicide bombers. For example, women may be assigned
to accompany a male suicide bomber on his mission in the hopes that her presence will detract attention from the male. Acting as a romantic couple, a male-female duo may be able to avoid scrutiny at checkpoints equally as effectively as single women can. Therefore, women provide a strategic advantage
not only when they commit acts of suicide terrorism alone, but also when they serve as accomplices to men attempting to complete their missions. Furthermore, when women comprise part of a team suicide attack, the attack is likely to yield more casualties. These factors help to explain why women have come to be employed for acts of suicide terrorism.
Since women raise less suspicion than men, they are also able to access soft targets, such as politicians or other public figures that may be assassination targets. The most famous example of this is the case of “Dhanu,” a woman who belonged to the Black Tigresses (the female suicide bomber unit of the LTTE). In
May of 1991, Dhanu was able to get within a few feet of India’s top political figure, Rajiv Ghandi, because she appeared so innocent that Ghandi actually brushed his security team away to allow her to pass through the crowd and approach him. Then, she pretended to drop a flower garland on the ground and detonated her suicide belt, effectively killing herself, the LTTE cameraman that was filming the assassination, and, most
importantly, her target. Since she was able to reach her target without raising suspicion, she was able to kill this important political figure.
This photo shows Ghandi greeting a group of women seconds before Dhanu (the woman wearing glasses) detonated her suicide belt. The Dhanu case represents one of many assassination suicide attacks, and women have committed 72% of all such attacks for which the gender of the bomber has been identified.
This supports the argument that female are able to access soft targets more successfully than men. However, it is interesting to note that there have also been cases of men dressing up as women in order to
carry out suicide attacks. As such, it could be argued that from a strategic standpoint, women are not necessary to gain access to soft targets because men who make themselves look like women could potentially be just as effective. Of course, women would be more convincing and possibly less likely to
get caught than a man pretending to be a woman. However, the fact that men are able to pass as women makes it impossible for this factor to explain why terrorist organizations are willing to use female suicide bombers.

There are many reasons that terrorist organizations employ female suicide bombers. Strategically, female suicide bombers benefit their host organizations because they attract more attention and are glorified within their societies, which may inspire others to join their cause. Female suicide bombers also provide tactical advantages because they are able to pass through checkpoints with less scrutiny (especially when they appear to be pregnant) and thus can access soft targets. This makes their attacks more successful because they are able to kill greater numbers of people. All of these perceived advantages may enable terrorist organizations to more effectively fight their enemies or resist occupation.  Even though some religious organizations may be opposed to the use of female suicide bombers in theory, these strategic and tactical advantages make the acceptance of female martyrs more palatable. Since women who want to
become martyrs may do so regardless of who is sponsoring them, it is often beneficial for terrorist organizations to accept responsibility for the attack so that they can continue to reap the benefits long after the woman has martyred herself.  The topic of female suicide terrorism is extremely complex. Experts have examined both individual and group level motivations for female suicide terrorism and have come up
with a wide variety of explanations. On an individual level, internal factors such as the inability or unwillingness to marry or humiliation by opposition forces are given to explain why these women choose to become suicide bombers – to escape their situation or to empower or redeem themselves. However,
none of the commonly cited personal problems can explain why women become suicide bombers in and of themselves.  Worldwide, a countless number of women face these same problems but do not commit acts of suicide terrorism. These personal problems can help to explain why some women become suicide terrorists, but they cannot explain why all female suicide bombers make that choice. Therefore, it is also necessary to examine the issue at a group level. Suicide terrorism is a phenomenon that occurs within both secular and religious groups in response to external factors such as war or occupation. The tactical and strategic advantages offered by women may allow terrorist groups to further their objectives and attract attention within society. Though more useful than speculation about personal motivations, group motivations still cannot explain every case of suicide terrorism. It is clear that some combination of these individual and group motivations must come together in response to particular external factors in order to yield female
suicide terrorism. However, it is impossible to know exactly which set of circumstances will lead a woman to suicide terrorism, and equally difficult to prove which factors allow a woman to be accepted into or sponsored by a particular terrorist group. Thus, taken individually, none of the explanations given to
explain female suicide terrorism are sufficient and it is impossible to construct a model in which certain individual and group factors, even when considered along with the external factors present, can be causally linked to the phenomenon of female suicide terror. Any combination can yield female suicide terrorism, and thus acts of female suicide terrorism are not predictable. One problem with this conclusion is that without fully comprehending the factors that lead to female suicide terrorism, it is impossible for police or counterterrorism forces to develop a profile of potential terrorists. After September 11th, 2001, the
United States Department of Homeland Security created a terrorist profile to be used to issue visas – but that profile did not include women.  As previously discussed, there are more male suicide terrorists than female suicide terrorists, but since females seem to more easily avoid suspicion and access soft targets, it is vital that terrorist profiles recognize that female terrorists are within the realm of possibility.

This article has pointed out that terrorist organizations have adapted their suicide terror tactics to include female suicide bombers in order to avoid suspicion and gain access to soft targets. It is quite possible that security officials will become increasingly wary of women trying to cross checkpoints. As a result, terrorist organizations will be faced with the challenge of developing new techniques for suicide terror operations,
and female suicide bombers may no longer provide as much of a strategic or tactical advantage. As women become less effective, terrorist groups may turn to other demographics in order to achieve their goals.  There is concern, however, that this is already happening. International human rights groups have stated
that Palestinians are willing to use children as suicide bombers, even though according to an agreement signed by the Palestinian Authority, no child under the age of eighteen is allowed to participate in hostilities. However, at least three male suicide bombers under the age of eighteen have died over the
course of that particular conflict, all representing the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade. One of these successful suicide bombers, Issa Bdeir, was only sixteen years old, which shows that the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade may be open to using increasingly younger individuals as suicide bombers. However, there are many reasons that terrorist organizations may not want to use children as suicide bombers. For one thing, a younger suicide bomber may not be savvy enough to choose an appropriate location or be able to talk his/her way out of a difficult situation. Furthermore, it is unknown what the population’s reaction to a child suicide bomber would be; the public might consider such actions too extreme and thus refrain from supporting such measures, leading the terrorist organization to lose public support. Finally, children cannot
make the choice to become a suicide bomber, so child suicide bombers would be fundamentally different than adult ones.  As a result, for the time being, it seems probable that terrorist organizations will continue to use adult suicide bombers as long as their strategic goals continue to be met.  The further exploration of the topic of profiling and the contemplation of future terrorist demographics is not within the scope of this article, though both topics warrant more extensive research. However, the existence of female suicide bombers raises serious questions about whether profiling works. After all, terrorist organizations have used women to conduct suicide attacks because they raise less suspicion and can thus access soft targets. As soon as women are no longer effective, terrorist organizations may attempt to recruit from different demographics. In order to prevent suicide attacks from occurring, counterterrorism efforts must focus on identifying new potential suicide bomber demographics and continuing to develop technologies and ways to identify warning signs (such as behaviors) that a person may be a suicide bomber.

The final point to be drawn from this study, though, is that neither male nor female suicide bombers have been able to cause foreign occupants to end their occupation or to respond with more military force. Both groups are also unable to provoke changes in the policies or practices of their target governments. Using this particular measure, since neither male nor female suicide bombers have been able to cause their
enemies to grant large concessions, they are of equal value.  However, when viewed through the lenses of individual, strategic, and tactical logics, female suicide bombers are inherently different than male suicide bombers, though perhaps only because they are interpreted to be so. Though impossible to quantify, the societal definitions of the roles of men and women may allow female suicide bombers to elicit a stronger reaction, garner more media attention, or become more glorified. Additionally, in conservative societies, where the modesty of a woman is of vital importance, women do offer tactical advantages to terrorist organizations because their gender allows them to avoid scrutiny by security guards and gain access to soft targets. Overall, although female suicide bombers may offer some advantages over men, neither group
has been able to cause any significant change in the tactics of their enemy. Therefore, by some measures, female suicide bombers are different, but their value in terms of affecting the opposition’s decision-making process is equal to that of male suicide bombers.

President Sarkozy, what were you thinking?

Not only did he get drunk with former Russian President Putin and subsequently gave a G8 speech presumably drunk; he became known for his divorce from long-term wife Cecilia Ciganer-Albeniz and subsequent marriage to Carla Bruni. Given her impressive dating record, some  have referred to Miss Bruni as the famous man’s concubine, but I like to think of her as a beautiful woman who just happens to be compatible with rich and powerful men. More recently, Sarkozy also managed to insult one of the largest world religions, calling Islam a backward faith that is incompatible with French values.

To top off Sarkozy’s record of shameful conduct, the Economist published an article discussing the moral crisis that seems to have ensued in the ranks of Sarkozy’s conservative right-wing party.  Sarkozy’s colleague and former French President Mitterrand admitted to soliciting “boys” for sex during his vacations in Thailand. Around the same time, he exclaimed that he found the arrest of Roman Polanski, an America filmmaker charged of unlawful sex with a 13-year-old girl in 1977, “absolutely appalling”.

From an American perspective, the behavior of Sarkozy and Mitterrand would be unacceptable. Imagine President Obama leaving Michelle for a younger woman and giving press conferences under the influence, or if Joe Biden came out publicly endorsing prostitution.

When evaluating Sarkozy’s behavior, however, we have to step outside the (American) box. French society holds values that, in some ways, differ vastly from commonly held convictions in the United States. Take the subject of love. Romantic relationships in France take place in the private as well as the public setting. During my time in Paris, I grew more comfortable with couples publicly displaying their affection through excessive tongue action. The French more openly and publicly embrace love in all its dimensions, ranging from physical affection to marriage and sexual preference. With that in mind, Sarkozy’s openness about his divorce and remarriage appears more commonplace than unusual. In the same way, Mitterrand’s personal contribution to Thai sex tourism, while morally still objectionable, may not result in the kind of political suicide we would expect in the US.

Yet at the end of my discourse on French morality, I cannot help but wonder whether we in the US are all that different. Just because our presidents do not openly insult Islam, does it mean that they don’t hold significant prejudices against the Muslim community? Plenty of Muslims in this country could tell you about the misunderstandings and discrimination they encountered after 9/11. And just because we don’t like to see presidents get divorced or have extramarital affairs- even though many have revered the likes of JFK and FDR who have had less than clean slates-should we hold them to superhuman standards? Until we have answered these and other questions adequately, we may have to admit that French politicians are just a little more daring- daring to be imperfect.

Former NJIA editor and current staff editor at The Atlantic reflects on what to do in Afghanistan.

I wade into the Afghanistan debate with trepidation. I’m going to begin with something that’s customarily antithetical to American foreign policy: A dash of humility.

I have never published an Afghanistan paper in Foreign Affairs. I have never sat with an Afghanistan military general. I have never stepped on Afghanistan soil, much less spilled my blood on it. Being a part of one of those groups might grant me greater authority on the subject, but it wouldn’t necessarily grant me greater certainty about what we should do. After all, within each of these groups – the academics, the frontline reporters, the soldiers – there is a wide variety of opinion about the proper course in Afghanistan. Reasonable people, as they say, can disagree. But at least in the Washington tradition, their disagreement divides into two camps. They are the counterinsurgency camp and counterterrorism camp.

The counterinsurgency camp – sometimes called COIN – holds that the United States needs up to 40,000 additional troops to help defeat the terrorists and build a stable government, quell the rogue parts of Afghanistan and construct a civil society. The counterterrorism camp has more limited goals. It sees nation-building in Afghanistan as a pipe dream and instead seeks to limit America’s “footprint” in a land we’ve been trying to nation-build for the better part of this decade.

At least some of the momentum behind COIN comes from the perceived success of The Surge in Iraq. The Surge worked, I think, but not simply because we increased our troop levels. It worked because the United States found a partner against terrorism in the Sunnis. It won because the military spent its prodigious sums bribing tribal leaders. Some military strategists call the Afghanistan war an investment. But each year for the past seven years, we’ve spent between two and three times the GDP of Afghanistan for the purpose of saving it. As Nicholas Kristof wrote, Afghani nationalists have good reason to mistake that kind of “investment” for a hostile takeover.

Our financial advantage in Afghanistan has not brought military victory but we can use it to buy civic order. While maintaining a light footprint and relying on unmanned drones to patrol terrorist  hot spots, we should start buying the support of tribal leaders outside of Kabul to do what the corrupt and incompetent Karzai government cannot: Incentivize cooperation against the terrorist fringe of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. It will not be wholly moral. We will deal with horrific people. Progress will be slow. There will be set-backs and risks to creating an alliance whose glue is American money. But this represents our best and most realistic chance to salvage our mission in Afghanistan.

We don’t know what we’re going to get from a massive build-up of troops. We don’t know what we’re going to get from pursuing a status quo strategy, or a strategy of bribery. Here’s what we know. A build up is going to cost hundreds of billions of dollars we cannot afford. It will require partnering with a regional ally we do not have. It will risk thousands of American and Afghani lives for a war Americans don’t believe in and Afghans don’t want.

A final note about the flurry of op-eds you’ll read from experts much wiser than me arguing for a more ambitious strategy: When you’re reading these pretty polemics, ask yourself what the author means by “victory” in Afghanistan. Ask whether he uses the phrase “America must” because the ends are self-evidently crucial or because his argument requires the crutch of alarmism. Ask whether a country that can hardly afford medicine for its citizens can afford to build a nation in Asia. Ask what this war is for in the first place. As for me, my response to the elegant and ambitious arguments of the other side is simply this: Your words are too easy, and this war is too hard.

Why is the United States particularly reluctant to ratify major international treaties that bind countries to uphold human rights while claiming to be the world’s champion for these rights? Unlike many of its closest allies in Western Europe and much of the non-Western world, the United States since the mid-1950s has been exceedingly slow to ratify many of the most important international human rights conventions and covenants. The United States for example first signed the Genocide Convention in 1948 but did not officially ratify it until four decades later; similarly, although every other member state in the United Nations (UN) has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the United States still fails to even engage in a serious debate about the merits of this treaty. In some cases, the United States is in the company of such rogue nations as Syria, North Korea, and Iran in its refusal to support these human rights instruments.

Beyond the failure of the United States to ratify the Genocide Convention, the existing scholarship on the American relationship to international human rights law is underdeveloped.1In this essay, I examine the opposition to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in order to illuminate the larger factors shaping America’s problematic relationship with international human rights treaties.

CEDAW is often referred to as the “international bill of rights for women.” This major UN human rights convention consists of thirty articles that “protect the right of women to enjoy fundamental human rights on an equal basis with men.”2 CEDAW defines gender discrimination in both public and private life and suggests methods for improving the status of women in areas as diverse as healthcare, prostitution, the role of women in the family and equality in the workforce. The UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) began drafting the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1975, and the General Assembly adopted a final version of the treaty in 1979. The monitoring mechanism used to enforce CEDAW requires that states party to the treaty submit a monitoring report during the first year after ratification and every four years following the first report. Ratifying nations are also expected to implement policies that foster gender equality in areas where the monitoring reports show that it is lacking.

In 1980 President Jimmy Carter signed CEDAW on behalf of the United States, but the Reagan Administration ignored the Convention until 1988, when Senator John Kerry presided over the first congressional hearing on the treaty.3 In 1990, 1994 and 2002, the Committee on Foreign Relations again held hearings on CEDAW.4 Two of these hearings led to the approval of the treaty by the Committee, but the full Senate has never ratified it.

The failure of the United States to ratify CEDAW is due to a complex dynamic of American concerns surrounding international law and domestic politics. Three singular characteristics of American human rights policy – fear, reluctance, and unilateralism – figured significantly in the CEDAW debates. After briefly framing the historical, legal and structural issues that affect ratification, this essay focuses on the domestic debates over CEDAW in the United States. Exploring the domestic politics that have prevented the United States from ratifying CEDAW reveals the ways in which a socially conservative agenda on women’s issues has shaped the contours of the CEDAW ratification debates and the nature of American leadership, both real and perceived, in global human rights politics.

EXCEPTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALHUMAN RIGHTS

In an apparent paradox, most American policymakers believe that the United States leads the international community in the advancement of human rights while maintaining an “exceptionalist” status outside of that community. Through both rhetoric and policy, many American policymakers promote the notion domestically and internationally that the United States willingly assumes the role of a global leader in international human rights and regards this commitment as a priority when constructing foreign policy. These policymakers simultaneously undermine this role by frequently failing to fulfill the responsibilities that a leadership position necessitates, including participating in international organizations, honoring international law, providing resources and support for humanitarian interventions, and ratifying and complying with international treaties. The justification they offer is that America is somehow morally superior to other nations and thus must follow its own noble purposes.5