MATTHEW JACOBS
[Fall 2009, Volume X, Issue I]
INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 2007 the United States intelligence community made public certain key judgments of a classified national intelligence estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. The estimate’s surprising conclusion—that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003—clashed with the prevailing consensus that Iran was determined to develop nuclear weapons. This paper seeks to shed light on the flaws in the NIE that led to its erroneous conclusion.
The NIE’s most significant flaw is its failure to characterize Iran’s ongoing “declared civil” uranium enrichment …

KIRA BAIASU

Can the House of Saud adapt and survive in the face of a rising business class and the descent of the Ulama?

“There is always good news, but it has been drowned out by the bad news.”